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Abstract
Trigger-action platforms are a new type of system that con-
nect IoT devices with web services. For example, the popular
IFTTT platform can connect Fitbit with Google Calendar
to add a bedtime reminder based on sleep history. However,
these platforms present confidentiality and integrity risks as
they run on public cloud infrastructure and compute over
sensitive user data. This paper describes the design, imple-
mentation, and evaluation of Walnut, a low-trust trigger-action
platform that mimics the functionality of IFTTT, while en-
suring confidentiality of data and correctness of computation,
at a low resource cost. The key enabler for Walnut is a new
two-party secure computation protocol that (i) efficiently per-
forms strings substitutions, which is a common computation
in trigger-action platform workloads, and (ii) replicates com-
putation over heterogeneous trusted-hardware machines from
different vendors to ensure correctness of computation out-
put as long as one of the machines is not compromised. An
evaluation of Walnut demonstrates its plausible deployability
and low overhead relative to a non-secure baseline—3.6× in
CPU and 4.3× in network for all but a small percentage of
programs.
1 Introduction
The platforms that manage heterogeneous Internet of Things
(IoT) devices have become mainstream [23, 43, 44, 56, 60,
69]. However, these platforms undermine user confidentiality
and integrity as they compute over sensitive user data. There-
fore, a relevant question is: how can we build a system that
can manage IoT devices without incurring the security risks?
To expand on the motivation above, consider the case of
trigger-action platforms [43, 44, 47, 60]. They connect IoT
devices with web services through simple customizable pro-
grams. For example, a user can set up programs to sync Fitbit
with iOS Health [35], adjust home temperature when they
request an Uber to take them home [73], tweet Instagram
photos [46], turn off oven if the smoke alarm detects an emer-
gency [31], and even move money from checking to savings
depending on daily step count [45].
Besides providing connectivity across devices and online
services, trigger-action platforms are easy to use. They run in
the cloud and require no local, in-home installation or mainte-
nance. Furthermore, they allow a user to go offline indefinitely
after setting up a program. Finally, their interfaces are so sim-
ple that an average internet user can specify programs for
them with only a few clicks. Indeed, popular trigger-action
?Student authors contributed equally to the paper.
platforms like IFTTT [43] run tens of millions of programs
daily on behalf of their users [58, 59].
However, this connectivity and convenience comes at a cost
(§2). When users opt to run programs on these platforms, they
must provide unobstructed access to sensitive data needed by
the programs (and generated or consumed by the devices or
services). Furthermore, the users assume that the platforms
correctly perform actions on their behalf: adjust thermostat to
the right temperature, post the intended tweet, do not tamper
with health data, and remove the right amount of money from
the checking account.
The security risks affect not just the users: when platform
providers operate on user data, they become liable for protect-
ing it. Indeed, under new privacy regulations in California and
EU [1, 2], a business can be subject to a class action lawsuit
or large fine (for example, up to 4 percent of global annual
revenue) for data breaches and misuse.
Given the popularity of trigger-action platforms, there is
prior work targeting improved security for them [25, 26, 78].
However, as we discuss later (§9), these works provide con-
fidentiality or integrity exclusively, and suffer from a funda-
mental weakness that shifts security risks from the platform
to the connected services.
In this paper, we address these limitations and demonstrate
that we do not need to compromise significantly on security to
support the automation provided by trigger-action platforms.
We present Walnut, a trigger-action platform that provides the
same functionality as IFTTT, but with much stronger confi-
dentiality and integrity protection. Furthermore, this added
protection does not affect the security at the connected ser-
vices, and comes at a modest resource cost.
To begin with, Walnut splits the platform into two parts
that run in separate administrative domains (Microsoft Azure
and IBM Cloud) such that no part can access sensitive
data (§3.1). To obtain such a split, Walnut employs a two-
party secure computation protocol (2PC) called Yao’s garbled
circuits [80, 81], which allows two parties to perform arbitrary
computation on their secret inputs without revealing their in-
puts to each other. Yao’s protocol is powerful as it supports
arbitrary computation but it is also expensive in terms of CPU
time and network transfers.
Walnut makes two observations. First, typical programs on
trigger-action platforms perform simple computations: they
either pass a sensitive string from one device or service to
another without modification, or substitute strings from a
dictionary of sensitive strings into a user-supplied template
string. Second, the names of the keys in the dictionary are
publicly known. Based on these observations, Walnut designs
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a custom two-party secure computation protocol for the typi-
cal trigger-action platform programs. Walnut’s protocol leaks
coarse-grained information such as the approximate positions
in the template string where the strings from the dictionary
get substituted. However, it significantly reduces overhead
relative to Yao’s protocol; in particular, it eliminates network
overhead between the two parties in the protocol (§4).
The 2PC protocol described so far allows Walnut’s plat-
form to compute over sensitive data but does not prevent the
platform from deviating from the protocol and producing arbi-
trary program output. To efficiently add integrity guarantees,
Walnut extends the protocol to use trusted-hardware machines
such as those with Intel SGX [20] and AMD SEV [50] ca-
pabilities. These machines provide a trusted execution en-
vironment (TEE) that can load and execute a computation
such that an external entity cannot tamper with its execution.
However, a limitation of using TEEs is that they introduce
a large trusted computing base (TCB), consisting of both a
software component and a hardware component.
The software part can be moved out of the TCB by formally
verifying that the software meets its required specification [10,
14, 27, 28, 39]. However, the hardware itself (the root of trust)
can be tampered, for example, through physical attacks [20,
32, 33, 52].
Walnut addresses this limitation by employing multiple,
heterogeneous TEEs from different vendors. In particular, it
runs a copy of the 2PC protocol described above over three
pairs of TEEs, where each counterpart in a pair resides in
one of the two domains (for example, Microsoft Azure or
IBM Cloud). Walnut’s protocol does not guarantee an output;
however, if it does produce an output, then the output is
correct as long as one of the TEEs is not compromised (§5).
Recently, Chandran et al. [13] explored this idea of multiple
TEEs to obtain theoretical feasibility results in cryptography;
however, this idea has not been explored in practical systems.
Besides using the two techniques above, Walnut’s 2PC pro-
tocol composes cryptographic primitives such as end-to-end
encryption, digital signatures, and hash-chaining of OAuth
authentication tokens. The latter, in particular, allows a user
of Walnut to go offline indefinitely after uploading a program
to run on the Walnut platform (§6).
We have implemented (§7) and evaluated (§8) a prototype
of Walnut. Our prototype runs on Microsoft Azure and IBM
Cloud. For sparsely-used programs for which Walnut resorts
to using Yao’s protocol, it incurs a high CPU and network
overhead: 54× for CPU and 1883× for the network relative
to a non-secure baseline that mimics IFTTT. However, for
typical programs that run on IFTTT (a manual inspection of
50 most popular programs per the dataset of Mi et al. [59]
reveals that 98% of them fall in this category), Walnut incurs
3.6× CPU and 4.3× network overhead relative to the non-
secure baseline. We also implemented 30 programs from
IFTTT (15 from the set of 50 most popular ones per Mi et
al. [59], and 15 selected randomly) on Walnut, demonstrating
IF sleep is under a target duration THEN 
add a reminder to Google Calendar. 
Input
title: "Slept 6 hrs. 
Sleep early"
Service: Fitbit
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target duration
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Input 
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Figure 1: High-level architecture of IFTTT [43] in the context
of a program (applet) that connects Fitbit service to Google
calendar service.
that Walnut is plausibly deployable.
Walnut’s limitations include coarse-grained leakage from
its customized 2PC protocol. Nevertheless, we believe Walnut
is useful: it provides a benefit to both users and platform
providers, as they can enjoy trigger-action automation with
significant improvement in data confidentiality and integrity,
at low resource cost.
2 Overview of IFTTT (IF-This-Then-That)
Walnut aims to mimic IFTTT’s functionality as IFTTT is
a popular trigger-action platform [8, 26, 59, 72, 74]. This
section gives an overview of IFTTT and describes the confi-
dentiality and integrity risks it presents.
Figure 1 depicts IFTTT’s architecture, which consists of
three key components: services, platform, and applets.
Services are either IoT device management services such as
the Fitbit service or online-only web-services such as Google
calendar. These services expose user information and provide
an ability to update that information through HTTP-based
RESTful APIs. For example, the Fitbit service exposes an
API that returns the sleep duration of a user. Similarly, the
Google calendar service exposes an API to add a reminder to
a user’s calendar.
The IFTTT platform runs in the public cloud (AWS cur-
rently). It aggregates APIs from all services and presents them
to applets. It is also responsible for executing these applets.
Applets are programs that stitch together two service APIs.
They are the core abstraction that IFTTT exposes. For exam-
ple, the “When you sleep less than the desired amount, add
a reminder on your calendar to go to bed early tomorrow”
applet connects the sleep duration API from Fitbit with the
add reminder API from Google calendar. An applet contains
a TypeScript code that takes the output of the first API and
manipulates it before feeding into the second API. For in-
stance, the applet depicted in Figure 1 takes the user’s sleep
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duration string “6 hrs” returned by the Fitbit API and adds
it to the title of the reminder. An applet also contains OAuth
authentication tokens [38] that allow the platform to access
the APIs on user behalf.
Confidentiality and integrity risks. IFTTT acts as a delega-
tee and runs applets on user behalf; this arrangement naturally
creates both confidentiality and integrity risks. In particular,
when a user creates an applet and loads it to the IFTTT plat-
form, or when the IFTTT platform executes the applet, the
platform learns sensitive information such as the APIs the
user intends to use, the parameters the user wants to send to
the APIs, and the information returned by the APIs. Similarly,
the IFTTT platform creates integrity risks because it may not
run an applet as intended. For instance, it may set an incorrect
time for reminder in the Fitbit and Google calendar example
discussed above. In other examples, it may cause more dam-
age: turn oven on instead of off, move an incorrect amount
of money from a user’s checking to savings account, drop
malware into user’s dropbox account, etc.
The confidentiality and integrity risks described above are
significant; however, the current design of the IFTTT platform
and the connected services exacerbates them. The connected
services give out OAuth access tokens with broad scope, so
that a user can authenticate with a service once and use the
token across applets that call different APIs at the service [24–
26]. Thus, if the platform misbehaves, it can create malicious
applets using the (broad) OAuth tokens.
Thus, our goal is to design mechanisms that address these
risks, that is, enable the IFTTT platform provider to keep user
data confidential while operating on it as intended by the user,
at low resource costs (CPU, network, etc.). We are not saying
that the IFTTT platform provider is inherently untrustworthy.
However, the platform provider runs the platform on a public
cloud. Besides, there are many cases of both internal and
external adversaries, such as rogue system administrators and
hackers, that can get into cloud infrastructure and steal and
tamper with user information [7, 19, 30, 75, 83]. On top of
that, the platform provider is incentivized to reduce risk for
user data due to the risk of significant fines and lawsuits under
modern privacy regulation [1, 2].
3 Overview of Walnut
3.1 Architecture
Figure 2 shows Walnut’s architecture. Walnut has the same
key components as IFTTT, namely the platform, services, and
applets, but makes modifications, particularly, to the platform
and the services.
Walnut’s platform runs over two servers, S0 and S1, in sep-
arate administrative domains such as Microsoft Azure and
IBM Cloud. Each server is logically centralized but physically
distributed; it contains trusted-hardware machines from dif-
ferent vendors (denoted as “TEE-A”, “TEE-B”, and “TEE-C”
in Figure 2) and general-purpose compute machines (labeled
collectively as M0 and M1 in Figure 2).
S1 on IBM Cloud
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purpose 
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TEE-B
TEE-C
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TEE-C
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ProofProof
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Call trigger 
API
Call action 
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0 1
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3
Figure 2: Walnut’s architecture. Solid, dotted, dashed, and
dashed-with-dots arrows respectively depict computation per-
formed during setup, trigger-polling, action-generation, and
action-execution phases of Walnut’s protocol.
The services implement the HTTP APIs. Today, they send
or receive plaintext data (over secure channels) to or from
the platform. Therefore, some change is necessary to sup-
port a secure Walnut platform. Walnut expects these services
to implement logic for basic cryptographic primitives such
as encryption, signatures, and secret-sharing (described be-
low), and to be aware of and hold public keys for Walnut’s
two servers and their TEEs. This logic is agnostic of the
API implementation, and thus can be implemented once and
distributed to all the services (for example, by the Walnut
platform provider).
In Walnut, as in IFTTT, the applet is the core programming
abstraction. Walnut does not make any change to this core
abstraction. Each applet consists of URLs for two APIs: a
trigger API and an action API. We denote the inputs to the
APIs as trigInp and actInp, respectively, and the output from
the trigger API as trigOut (the action API does not produce
an output). Each of trigInp, trigOut, and actInp is a set of key-
value pairs. filterCode is the code component of the applet
that produces actInp based on trigOut.
Walnut’s protocol to delegate execution of an applet to Wal-
nut’s platform has four phases: setup, trigger-polling, action-
generation, and action-execution.
• Setup. This phase (marked 0 in Figure 2) runs once per
applet. During this phase, the user creates the applet App
and gives its parts to the two servers: part App0 to S0 and
part App1 to S1. Each part contains signed ciphertexts or
secret-shares of the sensitive applet data. Secret-sharing
refers to the technique of splitting a secret s into two strings,
sh(s)0 and sh
(s)
1 , such that each string appears uniformly
random, but sh(e)0 ⊕ sh(e)1 = e.
• Trigger-polling. As in IFTTT, this phase (marked 1 in
Figure 2) runs periodically (every 15 minutes) or in re-
sponse to a real-time notification from the service imple-
menting the trigger API. In this phase, server S0 calls the
trigger API in the applet. In return, server Sb for each
b ∈ {0, 1} gets a signed secret-share of trigOut.
• Action-generation. This phase (marked 2 in Figure 2)
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follows the trigger-polling phase. In this phase, each Wal-
nut server uses its outputs from the two phases above, and
runs a cryptographic protocol with the other server to ob-
tain its secret-share of the input to the action API. That is,
Sb obtains sh
(actInp)
b . Server Sb also generates a proof that
it computed sh(actInp)b correctly. This phase uses the TEE
machines at the two servers.
• Action-execution. Finally, in the action-execution phase
(marked 3 in Figure 2), the two servers send their output
from the action-generation phase to the service implement-
ing the action API, who performs checks on the proofs,
merges the shares of the API input, and executes the API.
3.2 Threat model and security definitions
We consider two settings for Walnut, passive and active, de-
pending on the power of the adversary. In the passive setting,
the adversary is honest-but-curious, meaning that it follows
the protocol description but tries to infer sensitive user data by
inspecting protocol messages. In this setting, Walnut uses only
the general-purpose machines at Sb, which are collectively
denoted as Mb for b ∈ {0, 1}. The adversary can compromise
one of Mb for some b ∈ {0, 1}.
In the active setting, the adversary is malicious and can ar-
bitrarily deviate from the protocol. In this setting, each server
Sb uses three types of TEEs (made by three different vendors)
besides the general-purpose machines; we denote Sb’s three
types of TEEs by T(i)b for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The adversary can
compromise one of Mb for b ∈ {0, 1}, and at most two of
T(0)b , T
(1)
b and T
(2)
b .
We define security notions for the two settings separately.
Definition 3.1 (Passive security). A passive Walnut scheme
consisting of setup, trigger-polling, action-generation, and
action-execution phases is said to be L-secure if for any
honest-but-curious (passive) probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) adversary A corrupting Mb for some b ∈ {0, 1}, for
a leakage function L, for every large enough security pa-
rameter λ, there exists a PPT simulator SimL with access
to the leakage function, such that the output distribution of
the simulator is computationally indistinguishable from the
adversary’s view in the real protocol.
Definition 3.2 (Active security). An active Walnut scheme
consisting of setup, trigger-polling, action-generation, and
action-execution phases is said to be L-secure with abort if,
for any malicious (active) probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversaryA corrupting Mb, T(i)b , T(j)b for some b ∈ {0, 1} and
i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, with black-box access to TEE T(k)b implement-
ing functionality F (k)b for k ∈ {0, 1, 2} and k 6= i, k 6= j,
for a leakage function L, for every large enough security pa-
rameter λ, there exists a PPT simulator SimL with access
to the leakage function, such that the output distribution of
the simulator is computationally indistinguishable from the
adversary’s view in the real protocol.
Essentially, the definitions say that the view of the adver-
sary in an execution of Walnut’s protocol can be simulated by
knowing just the inputs to the simulator, which is defined by
the leakage function. Furthermore, the protocol aborts if the
adversary in the active setting deviates from the protocol.
For Walnut, the leakage function is defined as L(App),
which equals {K(App),P(App),F(App)}. K(App) equals
{K1, K2, . . . , Km}, where where m is the number of key-
value pairs in the actInp parameter to action API, and Ki =
{key1, key2, . . . keyki} contains the key names of key-value
pairs in trigOut that go into computing the i-th key-value
pair of actInp. P(App) equals {pos1, pos2, . . . , posm}, where
posi = {index1, index2, . . . , indexki} is the set of positions in
the i-th key-value pair in actInp where the key-value pairs in
trigOut get inserted. F(App) is the filterCode for the applet
and the URLs of trigger and action APIs.
3.3 Key techniques
Walnut’s protocol consisting of the four phases (setup, trigger-
polling, action-generation, action-execution) and meeting the
security definitions stated above uses three key techniques.
Tailored 2PC for IFTTT-like applets. Walnut’s protocol,
in the action-generation phase, uses a tailored two-party se-
cure computation (2PC) cryptographic sub-protocol to enable
its servers to obtain secret-shares of actInp. Walnut’s 2PC
protocol is tailored to the common filterCode that generates
actInp fields via string substitutions, for instance, by sub-
stituting the value of duration in the template string “Slept
{{duration}}. Sleep early.” Although Walnut’s protocol leaks
a small amount of information, captured in the leakage func-
tion above, it is significantly more efficient than a general-
purpose 2PC protocol [80] (§4).
Proof replication across heterogeneous TEEs. Walnut, dur-
ing the action-generation phase, uses trusted hardware ma-
chines to generate hardware attestations (which we call proofs
for simplicity) that the code to generate action API input is
executed inside a trusted execution environment (TEE). How-
ever, relative to a solution that would use a single TEE for
proof generation, Walnut replicates proof generation over
heterogeneous TEEs such that as long as one TEE works
correctly, an adversary cannot pass a proof check and result
in an incorrect invocation of the action API (§5).
Chaining of OAuth tokens. Walnut, as in IFTTT, ensures
that a user can go offline after executing the setup phase.
To enable this behavior, Walnut creates signed tuples of the
expirable OAuth token supplied by the user during the setup
phase and fresh OAuth tokens generated by the services (§6).
Besides these three techniques, Walnut uses standard cryp-
tographic primitives such as encryption, hashing, and signa-
tures. The next three sections (§4–§6) dive into the details
of Walnut’s protocol. We begin by making a simplifying as-
sumption that the OAuth tokens do not expire. Under this
assumption, we first present Walnut’s design that meets the
security definition for the passive setting described above
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Walnut’s protocol for the passive security setting
• This protocol has four parties: a user, Walnut’s platform consisting of machines M0 and M1 in separate administrative domains,
a trigger service TS, and an action service AS. The protocol allows the user to install an applet and the platform to execute it.
• The protocol assumes that each entity has a (public, private) key pair (pkp, skp), for p ∈ {User, M0, M1, TS, AS}.
Setup phase
1. (Encrypt OAuth tokens) The user receives OAuth access tokens at-TS and at-AS from TS and AS, respectively. The user
encrypts these tokens, that is, computes Cat-TS ← Enc(pkTS, at-TS) and Cat-AS ← Enc(pkAS, at-AS).
2. (Encrypt trigInp) The user encrypts the trigInp input parameter, that is, computes CtrigInp ← Enc(pkTS, trigInp).
3. (Secret-share actInp) For each key-value pair (k, v) in install-time value of actInp, the user does the following:
(a) Splits v into blocks (t1, . . . , t`) at spaces and and punctuation marks. For instance, splits “Slept {{duration}}. Sleep early”
into (“Slept”, “ ”, “{{duration}}”, “.”, “ ”, “Sleep”, “ ”, “early”).
(b) For each ti, if ti is like “{{key-name}}”, sets sh(ti)b = ti. Else, secret-shares ti into sh(ti)0 and sh(ti)1 , s.t. sh(ti)0 ⊕ sh(ti)1 = ti.
(c) Sets sh(actInp)b [k] = (sh
(t1)
b , . . . , sh
(t`)
b ).
4. The user sends Appb = {T , Ab, fc} to Mb, where T equals (triggerEndpoint, Cat-TS, CtrigInp), Ab equals
(actionEndpoint, Cat-AS, sh(actInp)b ), and fc is the applet filterCode.
Trigger-polling phase
5. (Call trigger API) Machine M0 sends T to the trigger service TS (whose name is in triggerEndpoint URL in T).
6. (Generate shares of trigOut) TS decrypts and checks the OAuth token, executes the trigger API, and generates trigOut. Then,
for each (k, v) in trigOut, TS generates sh(trigOut)b [k] following step 3 above.
7. TS sends sh(trigOut)b to Mb.
Action-generation phase
8. (Generates shares of runtime value of actInp) Mb generates sh
(actInp)
b ← GenerateAI(sh(trigOut)b , sh(actInp)b , fc). GenerateAI
further calls either Yao’s 2PC protocol or Walnut’s string substitution function (Figure 4) depending on filterCode.
Action-execution phase
9. Mb sends (actionEndpoint, Cat-AS, sh
(actInp)
b ) to AS, who reconstructs actInp, validates at-AS, and executes the action API.
Figure 3: Walnut’s protocol for the passive setting to execute an applet. This protocol does not include concatenation and padding
of blocks, which is described separately in text. This protocol further calls Yao’s protocol [80] or the function in Figure 4.
(§4). This design does not require the TEE machines. We
then extend the design and present a protocol that meets the
security definition for the active setting (§5). Finally, we relax
the simplifying assumption on OAuth token expiry (§6).
4 Design for passive security
Figure 3 shows Walnut’s protocol for the passive security
setting discussed in the previous section (§3.2). This protocol
is optimized, in terms of performance, for the common types
of applets on IFTTT that perform simple substitutions: set
the value of a key-value pair in actInp by replacing parts of a
template string with values from trigOut. We briefly describe
each phase of the protocol below; the protocol figure contains
precise details.
Setup phase. First, the user obtains OAuth tokens for the two
services and encrypts them with their public keys (step 1 in
Figure 3). Second, the user encrypts trigInp as a single blob
with the trigger service’s public key (step 2 in Figure 3). Third,
the user splits the setup-time values in actInp into blocks and
secret-shares each block (step 3b in Figure 3).
Trigger-polling. In this phase, M0 sends encrypted blob of
trigInp to the trigger service implementing the trigger API.
The trigger service generates secret-shares of trigOut in the
same way as the user generates shares of actInp in the setup
step (step 6 in Figure 3). For instance, if one of the trigOut
key-value pairs is ‘duration’: ‘6 hrs’, then the trigger service
partitions the value ‘6 hrs’ into blocks (“6”, “ ”, “hrs”) and
secret-shares them.
Action-generation. M0 and M1 call Yao’s garbled circuits
protocol to run the applets’s filterCode over shares of blocks
from trigOut and (setup-time value of) actInp; the call to
Yao happens inside the GenerateAI function in step 8 in Fig-
ure 3. Yao’s protocol is general-purpose and can handle any
arbitrary filterCode. However, when the filterCode involves
simple string substitutions, M0 and M1 locally run the function
string sub shown in Figure 4. The string sub procedure
returns a single block for each key-value pair of actInp.
Action-execution. M0 and M1 send their outputs from action-
generation phase along with OAuth tokens to the action ser-
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# 'actInp_shr' is a list of block shares from user.
# shr(pad(str)) denotes a share of a padded block.
actInp_shr = [{"type": TEXT, "value": shr(
pad("Slept") + pad(" "))},
{"type": FIELD, "key-name": "duration"},
{"type": TEXT, "value": shr(pad(".") + pad(" ")
+ pad("Sleep") + pad(" ") + pad("early"))}]
# Input 'trigOut_shr' from the trigger service.
# Func. maps trigOut key-names to shares of actInp.
def string_sub(trigOut_shr, actInp_shr):
output = []
for part in actInp_shr:
if part.type == FIELD: # lookup key-name
output += trigOut_shr[part.key-name]
else:
output += part.value
return "".join(output) # concatenate the blocks
Figure 4: Walnut’s custom function for string substitution.
This function assumes that secret-shares of block of strings
are both padded and concatenated (explained further in text).
vice, who reconstructs actInp, checks the OAuth tokens, and
executes the action API.
Concatenation and padding. One issue with the protocol
described above is that it reveals to Walnut the length of
each block in the strings in trigOut and actInp. Walnut mit-
igates this leak by concatenation and padding. First, both
the user and the trigger service apply padding to each block
separately. This padding is configurable: each block can be
padded to a pre-determined maximum size, or each block can
be padded to the next higher size from a set of allowed pre-
determined sizes (for example, multiples of five, or powers
of two). Second, the user and the trigger service concatenate
padded adjacent blocks that do not contain key names. For
instance, (“Slept”, “ ”, “{{duration}}”, “.”, “ ”, “Sleep”, “ ”,
“early”) becomes three blocks (“Slept XXXX, “{{duration}}”,
“.XXXX XXXXSleep XXXXearly”), and (“6”, “ ”, “hrs”) be-
comes a single block (“6XXXX XXXXhrsXX”), where “X”
denotes padding.
Security analysis. The protocol described above meets the
passive security definition in §3.2; Appendix C.2 contains
a proof. But, at a high-level, the protocol encrypts OAuth
tokens and trigInp with the trigger service’s public key so that
they remain hidden from both Walnut servers. The protocol
also only reveals, to each Walnut server, secret-shares of large
blocks that are formed by padding and concatenating smaller
blocks; this leakage is captured in the definition in §3.2.
Notably, unlike prior work [25, 26], Walnut’s protocol en-
sures that the trigger and action service learn strictly the same
information as they do in IFTTT. In particular, the trigger
service handles request to the trigger API; it learns neither
about the action API nor how trigOut is used to invoke the
action API. Similarly, the action service learns only the act-
Inp parameter needed to execute the action API. Specifically,
padding both trigOut and actInp in the same way ensures
that the action service cannot outrightly distinguish parts of
a string that come from trigOut versus setup-time value of
actInp (just how it is in IFTTT). Thus, Walnut does not in-
crease data liability at the services—in line with the data
minimization or least privilege principle [1, 2, 22, 68].
Performance analysis. The setup phase runs once and thus
its cost gets amortized across multiple executions of an applet.
Here, we focus on the costs of the other phases.
In the trigger-polling phase, the use of encryption and
secret-sharing adds CPU and network overhead at the platform
and the services. However, this overhead is small, as encryp-
tion and secret-sharing are cheap operations which take less
than a millisecond (§8).
In the action-generation phase, if the protocol invokes Yao’s
protocol, then the CPU and network overhead for Walnut’s
two servers increases significantly, as Yao represents the fil-
terCode as a low-level, verbose Boolean circuit (a network
of Boolean gates such as AND and XOR), and incurs cryp-
tographic operations for each gate in the circuit [55, 71, 82].
However, majority of the time, Walnut calls the string sub
protocol, which performs cheap local computation. Indeed,
in the top-50 popular applets in the dataset of Mi et al. [59],
only one uses custom filterCode while the others use string
substitution. Similarly, in the 15 randomly selected applets
we implement (§8.4), none require custom filterCode.
The action-execution phase is also efficient like the trigger-
polling phase as it uses the cheap decryption and secret-
sharing operations.
5 Design for active security
Walnut’s protocol in the previous section assumes a passive
(honest-but-curious) adversary who can monitor protocol mes-
sages but not tamper with protocol execution. In particular,
the protocol in Figure 3 assumes:
(i) machine M0 does not corrupt the trigger part of the applet
T before sending it to trigger service (step 5 in Figure 3),
(ii) M0 and M1 do not tamper with trigOut or the applet parts
that feed into action-generation (step 8 in Figure 3),
(iii) M0 and M1 run GenerateAI correctly,
(iv) M0 and M1 do not tamper with the message sent to the
action service (step 10 in Figure 3), and
(v) machines M0 and M1 do not replay requests to action
service (requests to a trigger service are idempotent).
One way to relax these assumptions is to extend the pro-
tocol with zero-knowledge proofs [64, 70, 76] that allow
proving the correctness of code execution without reveal-
ing the sensitive data that the code is operating on. However,
these protocols are expensive. Instead, Walnut uses digital sig-
natures and trusted execution environments (TEEs)—recall,
in the active setting, each Walnut server has three TEE ma-
chines (§3.1). At a high-level, signatures enable services to
verify that that the information they are receiving has not
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Walnut’s protocol for the active security setting
• This protocol assumes each Walnut server Sb has a general-purpose machine Mb and three TEEs T
(0)
b , T
(1)
b , and T
(2)
b .
• The protocol assumes that each entity has a key-pair that it uses to sign messages and allow others to verify signed messages.
Setup phase
1. The user runs steps 1 to 3 in Figure 3 to create Appb = {T , Ab, fc}, for all b ∈ {0, 1}.
2. (Sign request to trigger API) The user appends a unique identifier TID to T , and asks TS to sign T . The user obtains
σT ← Sign(skTS, T).
3. The user adds σT and public key of trigger service pkTS to Appb, and sends Appb to each of Mb, T
(0)
b , T
(1)
b , and T
(2)
b .
Trigger-polling phase
4. (Call trigger API) M0 sends (Appb.T , Appb.σT) to trigger service TS.
5. (Generate signed shares of trigOut) TS verifies σT and runs step 6 in Figure 3 to get sh
(trigOut)
b . TS then samples a unique
identifier RID for response, constructs toutb ← (RID, TID, sh(trigOut)b ), and computes σtoutb ← Sign(skTS, toutb) ∀b ∈ {0, 1}.
6. TS sends (toutb,σtoutb) to Mb.
Action-generation phase
7. (Generate signed actInp shares) Mb sends (toutb,σtoutb) to each TEE T
(i)
b , who does the following:
(a) Checks toutb is from the correct TS and for the correct trigger API:
i. Asserts Verify(Appb.pkTS, toutb,σtoutb) is True.
ii. Asserts TID in toutb equals Appb.T .TID.
(b) (Generate actionFields shares) Runs step 8 in Figure 3 with T(i)1−b to generate sh
(actInpi)
b .
(c) (Sign request to action service) Constructs ain(i)b ← (toutb.RID, actionEndpoint, Cat-AS, sh(actInpi)b ), where actionEndpoint
and Cat-AS are part of Ab in Appb. Then, T
(i)
b computes proof-T
(i)
b ← Sign(skT(i)b , ain
(i)
b ), gives (proof-T
(i)
b , ain
(i)
b ) to Mb.
Action-execution phase
8. (Send request) Mb sends ain
(i)
b from any one of its TEEs to AS. Mb also sends proof-T
(i)
b for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
9. (Check proofs) For all b ∈ {0, 1}, and for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, AS asserts Verify(pkT(i)b , ain
(i)
b , proof-T
(i)
b ) equals True.
10. AS checks RID in ain(i)0 and ain
(i)
1 is equal and unique, reconstructs actInp, validates OAuth token, and executes action API.
Figure 5: Walnut’s protocol for the active security setting. This protocol uses the TEE machines at Walnut’s two servers.
been tampered. Meanwhile, TEEs such as Intel SGX [48],
AMD SEV [50], ARM TrustZone [5], provide a tamper-proof
sandbox for executing computation. Figure 5 shows Walnut’s
protocol that incorporates these integrity primitives; we now
briefly describe each phase and reflect on the protocol’s secu-
rity guarantees and performance.
Setup and trigger-polling. The main difference in these
phases (relative to the passive security protocol) is the ad-
dition of signatures (steps 2 and 5 in Figure 5) to the input
and output of the trigger API. Besides signatures, these phases
add unique IDs, particularly to the output of the trigger API.
Action-generation. This phase uses the TEE machines at
the two servers. Each TEE (i) matches the response from
the trigger service to the correct applet (step 7a in Figure 5),
(ii) runs the GenerateAI function, and (iii) signs its part of
the request to the action service (step 7c in Figure 5). This
signature becomes a proof that the action service should act on
the request. However, since all but one of the TEE machines
may be compromised (§3.2), the action service acts on the
request only if proofs from all the TEEs are valid.
Action-execution. The action service checks the proofs, en-
sures the uniqueness of the unique identifier in the request,
and executes the action API.
Security analysis. The protocol described in Figure 5 meets
the active security definition in §3.2. Appendix C.3 contains
a proof. But, briefly, the cryptographic binding guarantees of
digital signatures ensures that the messages the services re-
ceive are not tampered. Besides, the use of TEEs and equality
checks ensures that actInp are computed correctly. Finally,
the use of unique IDs ensures that requests to action service
are not replayed.
Performance analysis. As with the protocol for passive se-
curity, the cost of setup phase gets amortized across many
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invocations of an applet. Therefore, we focus on the costs of
the other phases.
The protocol adds (relative to the passive security protocol)
low CPU and network overhead in the trigger-polling phase,
for two reasons. First, signature generation and checking takes
less than a millisecond (§8), and each signature is 64 bytes
with elliptic-curve cryptography. Second, the trigger service
sends its output (step 6 in Figure 5) once to each server; in
contrast, a naive design would make the trigger service send
a copy of trigOut to each TEE separately.
In the action-generation phase, the main overhead is due
to the replication of GenerateAI function three times on the
three TEEs (step 7b in Figure 5). When GenerateAI further
calls Yao’s protocol, this increase is significant as Yao’s CPU
and network costs are high. However, when GenerateAI calls
Walnut’s efficient string sub procedure, then the impact on
the protocol is small.
In the action-execution phase, the protocol adds low CPU
and network overhead. Again, the protocol sends only one
copy of actInp from each server to the action service. Each
TEE does send a separate signature but signatures are small
in size (64 bytes each) and signature verification takes less
than a millisecond of CPU time.
6 Supporting OAuth tokens with expiry
So far, we have assumed that OAuth tokens do not expire
(the user puts tokens in applet during the setup phase and
goes offline). However, in practice, some IFTTT applets use
OAuth that do expire. This section first quickly reviews how
expirable tokens work, and then describe Walnut’s protocol.
Expirable tokens in OAuth protocol. The OAuth protocol
uses two tokens: an access token and a refresh token. Each
token has an expiration time. The holder of these tokens
includes the access token in regular GET and POST requests
to HTTP endpoints. However, if the access token is expired,
the endpoint returns a HTTP 401 unauthorized error. Then,
the token holder sends a refresh request to an OAuth endpoint
consisting of both the access token and the refresh token; if
the refresh token has not expired, the endpoint returns a new
access token and refresh token [38].
Walnut’s protocol to support OAuth token refresh. One
way for Walnut to support expirable tokens is to use the
TEEs at the two servers, who could initiate the refresh tokens
request and update the tokens in an applet. However, Walnut
uses a protocol that avoids the use of TEEs. Walnut’s high-
level idea is to use a signed chain of encrypted tokens—to
link the original user-supplied tokens with new tokens.
Assume that time is split into epochs, beginning with the
0-th epoch. Also, let atk be the valid access token in the k-th
epoch, and define (Enc(pk, at0‖atk),σk) as the token-chain
for the same epoch; here, encryption is under the key of the
entity issuing the tokens (a trigger or action service) and σk
is a signature by the same entity over the ciphertext. Then,
during a regular HTTP request to a trigger or action API in
the k-th epoch (steps 4 and 8 in Figure 5), machines M0 and
M1 at Walnut’s platform append the k-th token-chain to the
request. When the service receives the request, it verifies the
signature, and matches the at0 part of the chain to the original
user-supplied access token in the request. If there is a match,
then the service replaces the original token in the request with
atk (this replacement is done in the API-agnostic logic added
to the services; §3.1).
A question is: how does Walnut’s machines M0 and M1
obtain the token-chain for the k-th epoch? The user supplies
the chain for the 0-th epoch, that is, (Enc(pk, at0‖at0),σ0),
as part of the applet during setup. To enable M0 and M1 to
get the chain for the k-th epoch, Walnut extends the refresh
token request to the OAuth endpoint. As mentioned above
in the background, normally the token holder sends the re-
fresh and access tokens for the k-th epoch and receives re-
fresh and access tokens for the (k + 1)-th epoch. In Walnut,
M0 includes the token-chain for the the k-th epoch, that is,
(Enc(pk, atk‖at0),σk), in the refresh request. The service ver-
ifies that the token atk in the chain matches the token in the
regular part of the refresh request, and sends the chain for the
(k + 1)-th epoch, that is, (Enc(pk, atk+1‖at0),σk+1).
Security analysis. Walnut’s protocol with the extension de-
scribed above meets the active security definition in §3.2.
Appendix C.3 contains a proof. But, briefly, Walnut’s proto-
col keeps tokens (both original and in the chain) for all epochs
encrypted with the services’ keys. Also, the Walnut platform
makes a successful request to a trigger and action API if it
has a valid chain and a valid (but expired) user-supplied token.
Finally, Walnut’s servers get a chain for a new epoch only if
they possess the expiring (but valid) chain.
Performance analysis. The protocol extension affects mainly
the trigger-polling and action-execution phases. In particular,
the addition of token-chain to the requests to the trigger and
action APIs (steps 4 and 8 in Figure 5) adds CPU at the
services to verify the chain, and network transfers between
the platform and services to transport the chain. Meanwhile,
the refresh tokens request (to get a chain for a new epoch)
adds token chains but is made infrequently.
7 Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of Walnut (§3.1, §4–§6).
Our prototype is written in Python and C. The Python part
implements a web server that interacts with the user and the
services. The C part implements RPC servers inside TEEs to
execute the action-generation step of Walnut’s protocol. Both
parts build on existing libraries and frameworks, including
Flask [65] for the web server, MongoDB [63] for storing
applets, Authlib [79] for the OAuth protocol, OblivC [81]
for Yao’s garbled circuits, OpenSSL [18] for cryptographic
functions, and SGX-LKL [3] as a library operating system.
Walnut’s implementation over existing libraries is 2128 lines
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For applets with custom filterCode (≈1-2%), Walnut increases
platform-side CPU and network costs by 54× and 1883× over a
non-secure baseline. However, for common applets, Walnut
increases these costs by 3.6× and 4.3×.
§8.1
For all applets, Walnut increases CPU and network costs at trigger
and action services by up to 3.2× and 2.52×, respectively, relative
to a non-secure baseline.
§8.2
Walnut’s dollar cost for running the common applets is 3.74× of a
non-secure baseline. §8.3
One can program existing IFTTT applets on Walnut with ease. §8.4
Figure 6: Summary of main evaluation results.
machine vendor CPUs RAM SGX location
B1ms MS Azure 1 2 GB No SF, CA
DC4s v2 MS Azure 4 16 GB Yes Blue Ridge, VA
B1.1x2 IBM Cloud 1 2 GB No SJ, CA
bm IBM Cloud 4 16 GB Yes SJ, CA
n1-std-4 Google Cloud 4 15 GB No The Dalles, OR
Figure 7: Machines used in Walnut’s experiments.
of Python and 2721 lines of C.1
8 Evaluation
Walnut’s evaluation answers the following questions:
1. What are Walnut’s overheads relative to a non-secure
baseline that mimics IFTTT?
2. How much overhead do Walnut techniques (§4—§6)
incur?
3. For what kinds of applets is Walnut practical?
Figure 6 summarizes our evaluation results.
Method and setup. We compare Walnut to the following
baseline systems. NoSec is our Python-based reference imple-
mentation of IFTTT (IFTTT itself is closed-source). NoSec
uses Flask as a web server, MongoDB as a data store for
applets, and the Python requests framework [29] for HTTP
requests. W-Yao, W-C, and W-I are intermediate baselines
between NoSec and Walnut. W-Yao implements Walnut’s
protocol for the passive security setting. It provides confi-
dentiality but no integrity guarantees. Further, it uses Yao’s
protocol only for secure computation (§4). W-C builds on W-
Yao and adds Walnut’s custom protocol for string substitution
for the common types of applets on IFTTT (§4). W-I builds
on W-C and adds the use of digital signatures and TEEs for
integrity guarantees (§5). Walnut (W) builds on W-I and adds
the use of token-chains for refreshing OAuth tokens (§6).
We perform a series of experiments to answer the eval-
uation questions. In each experiment, we deploy a system,
execute an applet (described below), and measure CPU time,
wall-clock time, network transfers, and storage space use. We
measure CPU time and network transfers using kernel account-
ing frameworks /proc/pid/stat and /proc/net/dev, re-
spectively. We measure wall-clock time by instrumenting
code with Python’s time.time(), and storage space use by
1Walnut’s code will be made available on GitHub after its publication.
CPU time CPU time CPU time
for 10B for 100B for 1000B
secret sharing-related
XOR share 5.7 µs 21.0 µs 178.0 µs
XOR reconstruct 5.2 µs 32.0 µs 306.0 µs
encryption-related
ECIES encrypt 473.0 µs 491.0 µs 498.0 µs
ECIES decrypt 486.0 µs 491.0 µs 514.0 µs
signature-related
ECDSA sign 685.0 µs 692.0 µs 695.0 µs
ECDSA verify 550.0 µs 555.0 µs 559.0 µs
CPU time network transfers
Yao-related
φ = integer comparison 90.0 µs 6.2 KB
φ = string substitution 294.3 ms 862.1 KB
Figure 8: CPU times and network transfers for cryptographic
operations in Walnut and the baselines. The key-sizes of ellip-
tic curve-based ECIES and ECDSA are 256 bits. The elliptic
curve used is secp256k1. The overheads of Yao depend on
the function being computed inside Yao; integer compari-
son compares two 32-bit integers, and the string substitution
function replaces the braces in the template string “This is a
substitution {}” with another string of length 100 bytes.
reading statistics returned by MongoDB’s collStats.
We execute the “Get a daily 6:00 AM email with the
weather report” applet from Weather Underground [77]. We
choose this applet because it is both popular (installed over
30K times) and representative of the common IFTTT applet.
We run this applet with three types of filterCode. The “passing
around” filterCode sets the body of the email to the value of
the key-value pair with key “new weather type” in trigOut.
The “string sub” filterCode sets the body of the email by
substituting the placeholder in the template string “This is
an example of a substituted string. The new type of weather
is {{new weather type}}” with the key-value pair with key
“new weather type” in trigOut. The “custom code” filterCode
sets the email body to a variant of the string above depending
on the type of weather (“sunny” versus “rainy”). For Walnut
and its variants, we pad the template strings and the values
in trigOut as described in Section 4. We configure Walnut to
pad each block in a string to a power-of-two length.
Our testbed (Figure 7) is a set of VMs on Google Cloud,
Microsoft Azure, and IBM Cloud. We run the trigger and
action services on Google Cloud, and Walnut’s two servers on
Azure and IBM. Within Azure and IBM, we use both general-
purpose and TEE machines. Cloud providers currently offer
only Intel SGX-based TEEs [66]; we use three such machines
as the three TEEs for W-I and Walnut. However, the TEE
availability on cloud providers is improving [4, 66], and in a
real deployment, Walnut would use three different TEEs.
Microbenchmarks. Figure 8 shows CPU and network costs
for common cryptographic operations in Walnut and the base-
lines on machines of type B1.1x2 (Figure 7). Walnut uses el-
liptic curve-based encryption and signature schemes (ECIES
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Figure 9: Platform-side CPU time and network transfers for Walnut and the baseline systems for different filterCodes.
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Figure 10: Platform-side trigger-action latency.
and ECDSA, respectively). We will use these microbench-
marks to explain the numbers in the next subsections.
8.1 Platform-side overheads
CPU overhead. Figure 9 (a) shows platform-side CPU over-
head while varying the system and the filterCode in our work-
load applet. At a high level, the CPU overhead increases as
the complexity of filterCode increases. For instance, Walnut’s
CPU time is 62.0 ms for pass arnd, 62.9 ms for string sub, and
950.3 ms for custom filterCode.
For all three filterCode types, NoSec consumes the least
CPU, while W-Yao and Walnut consume the most. For in-
stance, for the string sub filterCode, W-C, W-I, Walnut, and
W-Yao consume 2.9×, 3.5×, 3.6×, and 17.7× the CPU time
of NoSec. This trend is expected as NoSec operates over
plaintext data and does not provide integrity properties, while
W-C adds secret-sharing, encryption, and tailored string sub-
stitution over shares of strings (Figure 3 in §4), W-I further
adds signature verification and generation inside TEEs (Fig-
ure 5 in §5), and Walnut adds token-chain to W-I (§6). W-Yao
consumes high CPU as it performs string substitution over an
encrypted Boolean circuit (§4).
Meanwhile, the CPU times connect back to microbench-
marks (Figure 8). For instance, Walnut adds 12.7 ms of CPU
time relative to W-C for the string sub filterCode. This is
primarily due to three pairs of signature generation and six
pairs of signature verification using OpenSSL inside TEE
machines; each signature generation and verification takes
≈0.7 ms and ≈0.55 ms, respectively.
Component NoSec applet Walnut Applet
title, description 27 bytes 27 bytes
filterCode 62 bytes 139 bytes
trigger 337 bytes 793 bytes
action 340 bytes 3506 bytes
total 766 bytes 4465 bytes
Figure 11: Comparison of storage space consumed by a
NoSec applet and a Walnut applet .
Network overhead. Figure 9 (b) shows platform-side net-
work overhead for the various systems and filterCodes. The
network trends resemble those for CPU. The costs increase
with filterCode complexity, and for each type of filterCode,
W-C, W-I, Walnut, and W-Yao incur successively increasing
cost over NoSec, except for the custom code filterCode where
W-C behaves like W-Yao.
Walnut incurs overhead over NoSec because it transfers
serialized ciphertexts, secret-shares, signatures, and token-
chains during the trigger-polling, action-generation, and
action-execution steps of Walnut’s protocol (§4–§6). As an
example, consider the trigger-polling message from Walnut’s
first server to the trigger service. In NoSec, the header of the
message is 219 bytes, while it is 383 bytes in Walnut. The
header increases by 164 bytes because the 64 byte OAuth
token in NoSec is ECIES-encrypted to a 161-byte ciphertext,
and then serialized to a final size of 228 bytes (step 4 in Fig-
ure 5). Similarly, the body of the polling message is 150 bytes
in NoSec and 826 bytes in Walnut, due to the addition of sev-
eral fields including 231 bytes of encrypted trigInp, 126 bytes
of a signature over trigInp, and 403 bytes of a token-chain.
Latency overhead. Figure 10 shows the time it takes for the
various systems to execute an applet. Our wall-clock timing
begins when the platform initiates the trigger-polling request
to the trigger service, and ends when the action services re-
ceive the action details. Walnut’s latency is 1.3×, 1.3×, and
32.7× of NoSec’s latency for the three types of filterCode.
The latency increase for the custom filterCode is high because
it calls the expensive Yao’s protocol.
Storage overhead. Figure 11 shows Walnut’s and NoSec’s
storage space use for the applet with the string sub filterCode.
Overall, Walnut’s applet takes 5.8× the storage space required
by the NoSec applet. This extra storage is due to the additional
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Figure 12: Trigger-service CPU time and network overhead for Walnut and the baseline systems for different filterCodes.
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Figure 13: Action-service CPU time and network overhead for Walnut and the baseline systems for different filterCodes.
components in Walnut’s applet, such as secret-shares of setup-
time values of actInp, and the overhead of encrypting, signing,
and serializing the components.
8.2 Service-side overheads
Trigger service overheads. Figure 12 (a) shows CPU time
for the various systems and the three types of filterCodes in
our workload applet. The CPU times have two notable aspects.
First, Walnut’s CPU time is 3.2× that of NoSec. The overhead
comes from confidentiality techniques (decryption of trigInp
ciphertexts and creation of trigOut secret shares) and integrity
design (verification and generation of signatures). Second, the
overhead does not vary with filterCode. This trend is expected
as the trigger components of the three applets are the same.
Figure 12 (b) shows the trigger service’s network overhead.
This overhead is 2.5× that of NoSec. Also, as with the CPU
costs, the network traffic is independent of the filterCode.
Action service overheads. Figure 13 shows action service’s
CPU and network overhead for the various systems and fil-
terCodes. Similar to the trigger service overheads, the CPU
costs are dependent on the system used. The CPU overhead of
Walnut relative to NoSec is due to the decryption and merging
of actInp shares, and signature verification for the “proofs”
from TEEs and the token-chain (§5, §6).
The network overhead also increases with the security pro-
vided by the system, and with the filterCode. The variation
across filterCodes is due to the fact that different filterCodes
result in actInp of different lengths. Finally, we notice that
for NoSec the action service-side network transfers (9.3 KB)
are larger than the platform-side network transfers (3.7 KB;
Figure 9 (b)). This is because the action service also commu-
nicates with Gmail to authenticate and send emails.
8.3 Dollar Cost
Walnut’s added overheads (§8.1) increase dollar cost for the
platform provider for running an applet. In this section, we
estimate these costs by converting Walnut’s raw resource
overheads into a dollar amount using a pricing model derived
from machine and data transfer prices of Microsoft Azure
(Appendix A). This model charges CPU at $0.198/hour and
network transfers at $0.087/GB.
Figure 14 shows the resulting dollar costs for the three
types of filterCodes (passing around, string substitution, and
custom code). For the common filterCodes (passing around
and string substitution), Walnut increases cost by 3.7× and
3.74×. However, for the custom code filterCode, Walnut in-
creases cost by 510.4×.
8.4 Compatibility
One of Walnut’s goals is to run any IFTTT applet. To study
whether Walnut can meet this requirement, we implemented,
using Walnut, (i) 15 randomly selected IFTTT applets from
the 50 most popular applets in the dataset of Mi et al. [59],
and (ii) 15 IFTTT applets whose applet IDs were randomly
generated (Appendix B). We found that IFTTT applets can
be implemented on Walnut in a short time—it took us 96
developer-hours to implement and test these applets.
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CPU time
Network
transfers
$-cost relative
to NoSec
passing around
NoSec 17.6 ms 3.6 KB 1×
Walnut 62 ms 15.4 KB 3.7×
string substitution
NoSec 17.6 ms 3.7 KB 1×
Walnut 62.9 ms 15.7 KB 3.74×
custom filterCode
NoSec 17.6 ms 3.7 KB 1×
Walnut 950.3 ms 6966.6 KB 510.4×
Figure 14: Dollars spent to run an applet on NoSec, Walnut.
9 Related work
Confidentiality and integrity risks in IoT middleware. Xu
et al. [78] study SmartThings, which is the Samsung platform
for managing Samsung smart devices, and report the move-
ment of sensitive information from SmartThings to IFTTT.
Fernandes et al. [24] also report security issues with Smart-
Things, in particular, over-privilege of access tokens. For
example, a SmartThings application may get a capability for
locking and unlocking a Samsung device even if it needs
to only call lock. Like SmartThings, IFTTT exhibits over-
privilege: 75% of IFTTT services issue broad-scoped OAuth
tokens [25, 26], as discussed earlier (§2).
Walnut is inspired by these works. It focuses on limiting the
exposure of sensitive data at the platform and and ensuring
that the platform does not misuse tokens (that is, always
performs the precise action intended by the user).
Reducing risks in trigger-action platforms. Almond [12]
is a virtual assistant that connects trigger and action services.
Unlike IFTTT, it allows the users to program applets using
natural language (rather than mouse clicks that build automa-
tion programs). Almond preserves confidentiality but makes
strong trust assumptions: it runs inside a single trusted device.
Xu et al. [78] use a filter-and-fuzz approach to provide
confidentiality. The filter part enables the trigger service to
eliminate parameters that are either not needed by an applet
or do not result in the firing of an action. The fuzz part adds
dummy trigger outputs to drown real outputs that cannot be
filtered. Filter-and-fuzz approach has a limited applicability
as it assumes that the trigger service has knowledge of the
actions. Indeed, Xu et al. apply their approach to Samsung’s
SmartThings where trigger and action services are in the
same domain. Furthermore, the approach adds high CPU and
network overhead to transfer and process dummy events.
DTAP [25, 26] eliminates over-privilege of OAuth tokens
by using applet-specific access tokens. In DTAP, a trigger
service signs trigOut, the platform processes the output in
plaintext to generate actInp, and the action service verifies
both the signature over trigOut and the correctness of actInp.
DTAP does not hide sensitive data from the platform. Besides,
it sends the entire trigOut structure to the action service to
verify signature and action-correctness.
Functionality Conf. Data Min. Integrity Efficiency
DTAP [25, 26]
Filter-Fuzz [78]
Walnut (§3–§6)
Figure 15: Comparison of Walnut to prior work for trigger-
action platforms. An empty circle ( ) denotes that the system
does not address the particular concern, while a full circle ( )
denotes that the system performs close to the ideal. The other
circles fall in between in an increasing order of superiority.
Walnut also targets security improvements for a trigger-
action platform. However, relative to prior work, it provides
both confidentiality and integrity guarantees (Figure 15). Fur-
thermore, in line with the principle of least privilege [22, 68]
(also called data minimization in modern privacy regula-
tion [2]), Walnut ensures that the services learn only the
information that is input to the trigger and action APIs.
Reducing risk in other types of IoT middleware. Bolt [37]
targets applications for smart homes (e.g., finding a lost pet in
a neighborhood). It stores data on an untrusted cloud provider
but runs applications on trusted in-home devices.
BeeKeeper [84] targets a streaming scenario in which an
IoT device streams data to a blockchain-based “leader” who
runs a query on it. BeeKeeper uses secret-sharing and se-
cure multi-party computation [36] to provide confidential-
ity, and threshold-cryptography to provide integrity. How-
ever, BeeKeeper does not target trigger-action scenarios; in-
stead, it computes quadratic polynomials (mean, variance,
and standard-deviation). Jayaraman et al. [49] target the same
scenario as BeeKeeper. However, in contrast to BeeKeeper,
they use Paillier encryption and do not provide integrity.
General-purpose crypto primitives for security. Secure
computation [36, 80] and homomorphic encryption [34, 67]
are vibrant areas of research [16, 17, 40, 41, 53, 54, 57, 71,
82]). These general-purpose primitives support arbitrary com-
putation but are expensive. Walnut uses Yao’s two-party pro-
tocol but only for a small fraction of applets (§4).
Zero-knowledge proof systems have also seen tremendous
development [6, 9, 11, 15, 21, 64, 70, 76]. However, the party
generating the proof incurs a large CPU time.
Walnut instead uses a mix of digital signatures and TEEs
for proving execution integrity at low overhead (§5).
10 Conclusion
Trigger-action platforms like IFTTT have gained traction due
to their convenience and connectivity. However, these cloud-
hosted platforms present confidentiality and integrity risks.
This paper asked the question, can we build a fortified alter-
native to IFTTT at a low resource cost, and found the results
to be encouraging. In particular, one can gain significantly on
security while restricting resource (CPU, network) overhead
to 4.3× for all but a small fraction of programs. Walnut’s
enabler is a new secure computation protocol that is tailored
for common computation on IFTTT and that distributes trust
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over heterogenous trusted-hardware machines from different
vendors. By demonstrating these promising results, Walnut
provides a benefit to both users and platform providers—they
can enjoy trigger-action automation with significant improve-
ment in data confidentiality and integrity.
A Pricing model
To get the dollar-cost of running an applet, we take the CPU
and network cost from our benchmarks and add them linearly
(§8.3). That is, if C is the hourly CPU cost and D is the price
for transferring one GB of data over the network, the dollar
cost to run each applet is of the form αC + βD, where α is
the CPU time required to run the applet and β is the amount
of data transferred to or from the Walnut platform during
execution. Our goal in this appendix is to estimate the values
of C and D.
The network cost is taken from the “outbound data transfer”
costs for Microsoft Azure which gives D = 0.087 (dollars per
GB) [61]. Meanwhile, estimating CPU cost is not straightfor-
ward. Machine prices on cloud providers are set using several
factors including maintenance and running expenses, market
demand, and peripheral costs such as DDoS protection and
load-balancing. Therefore, we make a simplifying assump-
tion that the machine cost on cloud providers is dominated
by the cost of CPU. We take the hourly cost of a DC4s v2
SGX machine on Microsoft Azure [62] that we use in our
experiments and divide by 4, which is the number of cores on
this machine. This method gives C = 0.198 (dollars/hour).
B Compatibility study applets
• The following 15 applets were randomly selected from the
set of the 50 most popular applets from the dataset of Mi
et al. [59]:
1. “Get a daily 6:00 AM email with the weather report”
(https://ifttt.com/applets/Zv56ZXwR)
2. “Update your Android wallpaper with NASA’s im-
age of the day” (https://ifttt.com/applets/
yNvHX9VQ)
3. “Sync all your new iOS Contacts to a Google Spread-
sheet” (https://ifttt.com/applets/dycqQ5A6)
4. “Automatically change your Twitter profile pic
when you update your Facebook photo” (https:
//ifttt.com/applets/qFZqXrvs)
5. “Automatically back up your new iOS photos
to Google Drive” (https://ifttt.com/applets/
90254p)
6. “Send a text message to someone with your An-
droid and Google Home” (https://ifttt.com/
applets/fNdGJfwy)
7. “Sync your Amazon Alexa to-dos with your reminder”
(https://ifttt.com/applets/ieCE52WK)
8. “Track your work hours in Google Calendar” (https:
//ifttt.com/applets/sFk2WC4r)
9. “Quickly create events in Google Calendar” (https:
//ifttt.com/applets/192007p)
10. “Press a button to track work hours in Google Drive”
(https://ifttt.com/applets/227069p)
11. “Back up new iOS photos you take to Dropbox”
(https://ifttt.com/applets/103376p)
12. “Backup your new Instagram photos to Dropbox”
(https://ifttt.com/applets/25679p)
13. “Post your Instagram photos to Tumblr” (https://
ifttt.com/applets/131p)
14. “Post your Instagram photos as native Twitter pho-
tos when #twitter is in the caption” (https://
ifttt.com/applets/68915p)
15. “Tell Alexa to email you your shopping list” (https:
//ifttt.com/applets/284243p)
• The following 15 applets were randomly selected from a
set of 78 randomly generated applet IDs:
1. “bloggin’ via Instagram: STEP 2 Flickr ->Tumblr”
(https://ifttt.com/applets/7p)
2. “End Harmony Activity using MESH” (https://
ifttt.com/applets/6163)
3. “Receive a notification when occupancy is detected”
(https://ifttt.com/applets/3820)
4. “Turn on Wemo Smart Plug using MESH” (https:
//ifttt.com/applets/6190)
5. “bloggin’ via Instagram: STEP 1 Instagram ->Flickr”
(https://ifttt.com/applets/6p)
6. “Tweet your newest uploaded Flickr pictures.”
(https://ifttt.com/applets/29p)
7. “Carry important file everywhere!” (https://
ifttt.com/applets/86p)
8. “Record each time you connect to your TP-Link
network in a Google Spreadsheet” (https://
ifttt.com/applets/6997)
9. “Test ifttt 1” (https://ifttt.com/applets/
09018)
10. “Switch on a socket with Amazon Alexa” (https:
//ifttt.com/applets/6569)
11. “Flickr favorites to Evernote” (https://ifttt.com/
applets/33p)
12. “Get an email when motion is detected at your front
door” (https://ifttt.com/applets/3726)
13. “Sing a love song to IFTTT Voicemail, send it straight
to my sweetheart” (https://ifttt.com/applets/
11p)
14. “Daily Forecast” (https://ifttt.com/applets/
2950p)
15. “Post your new Instagram videos with a specific
hashtag to a Telegram chat” (https://ifttt.com/
applets/4657)
C Security proofs
We first introduce definitions for the basic cryptographic prim-
itives such as secret-sharing, encryption, and signatures that
Walnut’s protocol builds on. We then present the proofs for
the passive and active security settings (§3.2).
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C.1 Basic cryptographic primitives
Secret-sharing. Walnut uses a 2-out-of-2 XOR secret-sharing
scheme, where both the shares are required to reconstruct the
secret. This scheme consists of two algorithms.
• Share(s ∈ {0, 1}`) → (k, k′) takes as input a `-bit string
and generate two secret-shares of the string: k and k′. In-
ternally, the procedure first samples k ∈R {0, 1}` and then
computes k′ ← k ⊕ s.
• Reconstruct(k, k′) outputs s← k ⊕ k′.
Correctness of the scheme requires the shares produced to be
reconstructable. Security requires that an adversary cannot
distinguish between the shares of two different input strings
of the same length.
Encryption scheme. Walnut relies on an encryption scheme
that is IND-CPA and IND-CCA2 secure. It consists of two
algorithms.
• Enc(pk, m)→ Cm takes in the public key, and the plaintext
message and outputs a ciphertext.
• Dec(sk, Cm)→ m takes in the secret key and a ciphertext
and outputs the plaintext message.
Correctness requires that ciphertexts produced from the
scheme can be decrypted to obtain back the original plain-
text. Security requires that the ciphertexts produced for two
different plaintext messages are indistinguishable. Walnut’s
implementation uses the elliptic-curve based ECIES encryp-
tion scheme (§8).
Signature scheme. Walnut relies on a standard signature
scheme which consists of two algorithms.
• Sign(sk, m)→ σm takes in a secret key and a message and
outputs a signature.
• Verify(pk, m,σm)→ {True,⊥} takes in the public key, the
message, and the signature, and returns either True or ⊥ to
indicate whether the signature on the message is valid or
not.
Correctness requires that a signature produced from the
scheme can be successfully verified by the verification algo-
rithm. Security requires the unforgeability of a valid signature
by an adversary, that is, an adversary cannot (without the
secret key) produce a signature that outputs True from the
verification algorithm.
We now move to the proofs for Walnut’s protocol.
C.2 Proof for passive security
Our goal here is to prove that the protocol described in Sec-
tion 4 (Figure 3) meets the passive security definition in Sec-
tion 3.2.
We prove the security of the protocol using the simulation
proof technique. Essentially, in this technique, there is an
ideal world adversary called the simulator which resides in
the ideal world (which is secure by definition). The real world
adversary interacts with the simulator, and the simulator simu-
lates the messages output by the honest parties in the protocol.
The simulator has access to the signing keys of the honest
parties. The protocol is said to be secure if such a simulator
exists and the adversary cannot distinguish between the real
execution of the protocol and the simulated execution.
Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A that compromises
the general purpose machine Mb for some b ∈ {0, 1}. The
honest parties in the passive setting are trigger service TS,
action service AS, and the general-purpose machine M1−b.
We then construct a PPT simulator Sim as follows:
1. Sim chooses a uniform random tape for the corrupted
party Mb. Sim simulates the honest parties TS, AS, M1−b.
2. In Setup phase:
(a) Sim sends encryptions of zeros as access tokens
and trigInp. That is, Cat-TSSim ← Enc(pkTS, 0|at-TS|),
Cat-ASSim ← Enc(pkAS, 0|at-AS|), and CtrigInpSim ←
Enc(pkTS, 0|trigInp|).
(b) Sim replaces each sh(ti)b not of the form {{key-
name}} in each sh(actInp)b [k] with Share(0|ti|)[b].
3. In trigger-polling phase: Sim replaces each sh(ti)b in
each sh(trigOut)b [k] with Share(0
|ti|)[b].
4. In action-generation phase: depending on the filter-
Code, Sim runs the simulator of Yao’s protocol or the
custom string substitution protocol (described shortly
below). In either case, the simulator is programmed to
output shares of the action input parameter sh(actInp)b cho-
sen uniformly at random.
5. In action-execution phase: Sim does nothing.
We now show that the distribution of the messages in the real
protocol and the outputs of the simulator are computationally
indistinguishable using the standard hybrid technique. This
technique refers to the strategy of proving that two tuples of
distributions (D1, . . . , Dn) and (D′1, . . . , D
′
n) are computation-
ally indistinguishable, if all the Dis (respectively, D′is) are
independently generated, and Di is computationally indistin-
guishable from D′i . The strategy is to consider a sequence of
hybrid distributions (D1, . . . , Di−1, D′i , . . . , D
′
n) and proving
every consecutive tuples of distributions are computationally
indistinguishable.
1. Hyb0: This corresponds to the real world distribution
where trigger service TS, action service AS and machine
M1−b execute the protocol as described in Section 4.
2. Hyb1: In this hybrid, we change the ciphertexts of tokens
and trigInp sent to TS, and ciphertext of tokens sent
to AS. More specifically, we replace the encryption of
tokens and trigInp with a bit strings chosen uniformly at
random. Hyb0 ≈c Hyb1 due to the semantic security of
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the encryption scheme.
3. Hyb2: In this hybrid, we change the shares of actInp and
trigOut. More specifically, each sh(ti)b not of the form
{{key-name}} in each sh(actInp)b [k] and sh(trigOut)b [k] is
replaced with bit strings chosen uniformly at random.
Hyb1 ≈c Hyb2 due to the security of the secret sharing
scheme.
4. Hyb3: In this hybrid, the simulators for either Yao’s pro-
tocol or custom string substitution protocol is invoked
which outputs honest shares of action input parameter
sh(actInp)b . Hyb2 ≈c Hyb3 due to the simulation security of
Yao’s and custom string substitution protocols (we prove
the latter below).
5. Hyb4: In this hybrid, we replace sh
(actInp)
b output from ei-
ther Yao’s protocol or custom string substitution protocol
with bit strings chosen uniformly at random. Hyb3 ≈c
Hyb4 due to the security of secret-sharing.
6. Hyb5: This corresponds to the output distribution of Sim.
Hybrids Hyb4 and Hyb5 are identically distributed.
Proof of security for custom string substitution.
Definition C.1. The custom string substitution protocol de-
scribed in Figure 4 is said to be L-secure if for any honest-
but-curious (passive) probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversary A corrupting Mb for some b ∈ {0, 1}, for a leak-
age function L, for every large enough security parameter λ,
there exists a PPT simulator Sim with access to the leakage
function, such that the output distribution of the simulator is
computationally indistinguishable from the adversary’s view
in the real protocol.
The simulator for string sub is constructed as follows:
1. Sim replaces each sh(ti)b in each sh
(trigOut)
b [k] with
Share(0|ti|)[b].
2. Similarly, Sim replaces each sh(ti)b not of the form {{key-
name}} in each sh(actInp)b [k] with Share(0|ti|)[b].
3. Sim replaces each sh(ti)b in each sh
(actInp)
b [k] output from
GenerateAI with Share(0|ti|)[b] and outputs sh(actInp)b .
We now show that the distribution of the messages in the real
protocol and the outputs of the simulator are computationally
indistinguishable using the hybrid technique.
1. Hyb0: This hybrid corresponds to the real world distribu-
tion of the execution of string sub function by machine
Mb. That is, {string sub(sh(trigOut)b , sh(actInp)b )}.
2. Hyb1: In this hybrid, we change the share of trigOut to
secret shares of zero. More specifically, each sh(ti)b in
each sh(trigOut)b [k] is replaced with Share(0
|ti|)[b].
3. Hyb2: In this hybrid, we change the share of actInp input
parameter to secret shares of zero. More specifically, each
sh(ti)b not of the form {{key-name}} in each sh(actInp)b [k]
is replaced with Share(0|ti|)[b]. Hyb0 ≈c Hyb1 ≈c Hyb2
due to the semantic security of secret sharing scheme.
4. Hyb3: This corresponds to the output distribution of Sim.
Hybrids Hyb2 and Hyb3 are identically distributed.
C.3 Proof for active security
Our goal here is to prove that the protocol described in Sec-
tion 5 (Figure 5) and Section 6 meets the active security
definition in Section 3.2. We first formalize the notion of
token-chains (§6) and then present the proof.
Definition C.2 (Token-chains). Let at-TS` and rt-TS` de-
note the access and refresh token for trigger service TS in
epoch `, and let at-AS` and rt-AS` denote the access and
refresh token for action service AS for epoch `. We de-
fine chainTS` equal to Enc(pkTS, at-TS0||at-TS`) as the token
chain for the trigger service TS for epoch `, and σTS` ←
Sign(skTS, chainTS` ) as the signature over the chain. Similarly,
we define chainAS` and σ
AS
` . Walnut’s protocol for active secu-
rity adds chainTS` ,σ
TS
` , chain
AS
` , and σ
AS
` to Appb.
Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A that compromises
the general purpose machine Mb for b ∈ {0, 1} and TEE ma-
chines T(i)b and T
(j)
b for some i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Then the honest
parties in the active setting are trigger service TS, action ser-
vice AS, TEEs T(k)b , T
(i)
1−b, T
(j)
1−b, T
(k)
1−b, and the general purpose
machine M1−b. Let k be such that k 6= i and k 6= j. We then
construct a PPT simulator Sim simulating the behavior of the
honest parties as follows.
1. In setup phase:
(a) Sim sends encryptions of zeros as access tokens
and trigInp, that is, Cat-TSSim ← Enc(pkTS, 0|at-TS|),
Cat-ASSim ← Enc(pkAS, 0|at-AS|), and CtrigInpSim ←
Enc(pkTS, 0|trigInp|).
(b) Sim replaces each sh(ti)b not of the form {{key-
name}} in each sh(actInp)b [key] with Share(0|ti|)[b].
(c) Sim sends encryptions of zeros as the token
chains, that is, chainTS`Sim ← Enc(pkTS, 0|chain
TS
` |),
chainAS`Sim ← Enc(pkTS, 0|chain
AS
` |).
(d) Sim generates simulated signatures σTS` ,σ
AS
` ,σT for
the uniform random ciphertexts chainTS`Sim , chain
AS
`Sim
,
and simulated T , respectively.
2. In trigger-polling phase:
(a) Sim asks A for its inputs to the trigger service TS:
T ,σT , chainTS` ,σ
TS
` . Sim additionally aborts the pro-
tocol if signature verification of σT and σTS` fails.
(b) Sim simulates trigger output toutb by generating
simulated shares of sh(trigOut)b : replacing each sh
(ti)
b
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in sh(trigOut)b [key] with Share(0
|ti|)[b] and generating
simulated signature σtoutb on toutb.
(c) Sim then sends toutb and σtoutb to A.
3. In action-generation phase:
(a) Sim asks A for its input toutb to the non-
compromised TEE T(k)b . Sim runs the checks de-
scribed in step 7a of Figure 5 and aborts the protocol
if verification fails.
(b) Sim simulates the generated action input parame-
ter shares sh(actInpk)b of TEE T
(k)
b by sampling each
sh(actInpk)b [key] for (key, v) in sh
(actInpk)
b uniformly at
random. Sim also generates simulated proof-T(k)b on
the simulated ain(k)b .
(c) Sim then depending on the filterCode, invokes the
simulator for maliciously secure Yao’s protocol
(this is Yao’s protocol secure against honest-but-
curious adversaries but with the underlying oblivi-
ous transfer sub-protocol replaced by a variant of
oblivious transfer secure against malicious adver-
saries [42, 51]) and generates simulated action input
shares sh(actInpi)b , sh
(actInpj)
b , and proofs proof-T
(i)
b and
proof-T(j)b as described in the above step.
(d) Sim sends ain(i)b , ain
(j)
b , ain
(k)
b , proof-T
(i)
b , proof-T
(j)
b
and proof-T(k)b to Mb.
4. In action-execution phase:
(a) Sim asks A for its inputs to the action service AS:
ainpb, proof-T
(i)
b , proof-T
(j)
b , proof-T
(k)
b , chain
AS
` ,
and σAS` .
(b) Sim runs step 9 of Figure 5 and checks RID as
mentioned in step 10 of Figure 5.
5. In token-refresh phase:
(a) Sim asks A for its inputs to the TS: chainTS` and
rt-TS. Sim checks the signature σTS` on chain
TS
` and
aborts the protocol if the verification fails.
(b) Sim generates simulated chain chainTS`+1 ←
Enc(pkTS, 0|chain
TS
` |), and signature σTS`+1 ←
Sign(skTS, chainTS`+1). Sim sends chain
TS
`+1 and σ
TS
`+1
to A.
Sim behaves symmetrically if the token-refresh request
is for AS.
We now show that the distribution of the messages in the real
protocol and the outputs of the simulator are computationally
indistinguishable using the hybrid technique.
1. Hyb0: This hybrid corresponds to the real world distribu-
tion where trigger service TS, action service AS, machine
M1−b, and TEE machines T
(k)
0 and T
(k)
1 execute the pro-
tocol described in Figure 5.
2. Hyb1: In this hybrid, we change the ciphertexts of tokens
and trigInp sent to TS, and ciphertext of tokens sent
to AS. More specifically, we replace the encryption of
tokens and trigInp with bit strings chosen uniformly at
random. The signatures σT ,σTS` and σ
AS
` are also updated
accordingly. Hyb1 ≈c Hyb0 due to the semantic security
of the encryption scheme.
3. Hyb2: In this hybrid, the shares of trigOut in toutb ob-
tained as the output of trigger-polling phase sh(trigOut)b is
replaced with a bit string sampled uniformly at random.
The signature σtoutb is updated according to the simu-
lated value of toutb. Hyb2 ≈c Hyb1 due to the security of
secret-sharing.
4. Hyb3: This hybrid is same as Hyb2 but Sim verifies
σT ,σTS` ,σ
AS
` in the trigger-polling phase and aborts if
the verification fails. Hyb3 is identically distributed to
Hyb2.
5. Hyb4: In this hybrid, the action generation output of T
(k)
b ,
sh(actInpk)b is replaced with a bit string sampled uniformly
at random. The signature proof-T(k)b is updated according
to the simulated value of ain(k)b . Hyb4 ≈c Hyb3 due to
the security of the secret-sharing scheme.
6. Hyb5: In this hybrid, the simulator of Yao’s protocol
that outputs honest shares sh(actInpi)b , sh
(actInpj)
b is invoked.
Hyb5 ≈c Hyb4 due to the simulation security of Yao’s
protocol.
7. Hyb6: In this hybrid, the shares sh
(actInpi)
b , sh
(actInpj)
b output
from the simulator of Yao is replaced with bit strings
chosen uniformly at random. The signatures proof-T(i)b
and proof-T(j)b are updated according to the simulated
value of ain(i)b , ain
(j)
b . Hyb6 ≈c Hyb5 due to the security
of the secret-sharing scheme.
8. Hyb7: In this hybrid, Sim additionally runs signature
checks mentioned in step 7a of Figure 5 and aborts if
verification fails. Hyb7 is identically distributed to Hyb6.
9. Hyb8: In this hybrid, Sim additionally runs checks men-
tioned in step 9 of Figure 5 and aborts if verification fails.
Hyb8 is identically distributed to Hyb7.
10. Hyb9: This hybrid corresponds to the output distribu-
tion of Sim in the ideal execution. Hyb9 and Hyb8 are
identically distributed.
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